San Petronio in Bologna, which was illuminated by the Sun shining through a hole in the roof of the nave at the summer solstice. His other great interest was the satellites of Jupiter, and his tables of their eclipses were carefully studied by Flamsteed and Towneley in England. Anna Cassini has given a welldocumented account of the various activities of Cassini in Bologna which, in a number of ways, were the foundation for his later career.
In 1663 his experience as an hydraulic engineer led to his being called to Rome to survey the basins of the Tiber in the papal states and the Arno in Florentine territory. There in 1664 he observed the great comet of that year in company with Queen Christina of Sweden who, not long before, had taken up residence in the Palazzo Riario (now Corsini) after abdicating and converting to Roman Catholicism. Cassini told in his autobiographical notes how each evening the Queen sent her page and coach to bring him to her palace, and how, as he had to be uncovered in her royal presence, she placed her handkerchief on his head as protection against the night dews while they observed. Cassini dedicated his account of the comet to the Queen. Later he advised the Queen to set up an observatory in the gardens of her palace, probably where the public Botanic Gardens are now found. He proposed that she should support regular observations of the satellites of Jupiter, and it was while so engaged early in the November of 1680, that the astronomers Cellio and Ponzio first saw the great comet of that year, to which Newton devoted a most extensive discussion in Book III of the Principia. The Queen offered a prize for the calculation of the path of the comet, but as the Principia was still in the future, no one claimed the prize.
Meanwhile Cassini had moved to Paris. Louis XIV had originally asked the Pope to allow Cassini to make a visit of some two months, but after arriving in April 1669 he never left the service of the king. Cassini arrived in Paris just as Perrault was presenting his designs for the new Observatory to the king, and he at once pointed out that the building would be unsatisfactory. Perrault managed to convince the king that the large and majestic structure he had conceived was what was required for the glory of France, whereas Cassini was hampered in his arguments by his poor command of French. The site of the Observatory was well chosen, upon a cliff falling away to the south, with convent gardens all around, so that in every direction there was a good view of the horizon. The building itself, however, obscured much of that view, so that good fundamental observations were never possible, and no catalogue comparable with that of Flamsteed ever came from Paris.
Nonetheless, Cassini did much else in Paris. He discovered the three rules of the libration of the Moon that go by his name. For many years he had worked on a chart of the Moon's surface, which he brought to fruition just at the time that Halley visited him in Paris in 1681, and Halley was able to obtain a copy for his English colleagues.
He discoverd two satellites of Saturn, and continued his study of the satellites of Jupiter. His colleague Römer showed that some of the anomalies implied that light had a finite velocity; Cassini himself never accepted that interpretation.
Halley left England for France at the end of 1680, just after the great comet had been seen by Hooke and others, and he arrived in Paris on Christmas Eve. His visit was clearly welcome to Cassini, and the two of them, with other colleagues at the Observatory, immediately began observations of the comet, as Halley reported to Hooke and Flamsteed. Cassini gave an account of their common activity in the tract that he presented to Louis XIV in March 1681, in which he seems to imply that Halley was responsible for many of the calculations of the position of the comet. After Halley left Paris for Saumur and Italy in May 1681, he continued to keep Cassini informed of what he was doing, and on his return to Paris in January 1682, brought with him a letter from colleagues in Rome. Halley clearly got on well with Cassini, although subsequently he criticized his failure to accept Römer's discovery of the speed of light, and he had no illusions about the unsatisfactory design of the Observatory and the inadequate instruments that were mounted there.
If at the end of the 17th century, Flamsteed was without doubt making the outstanding fundamental observations of stars, Cassini in France led the way in geodesy, which was probably his prime contribution to science. Just as Flamsteed applied the most strict standards to his observations of stars, so did Cassini to terrestrial observations, to triangulation and observations of latitude and longitude. In the 18th century other great Astrono-mers Royal, with better instruments and more profound knowledge of the heavens, built upon the foundations that Flamsteed had laid in his Historia Coelestis Britannica; and so in France other great geodesists followed Cassini, their work culminating in the choice of the quadrant of a meridian as the basis of the international metric system.
Cassini was the patriarch of French, indeed of European, geodesy; he was also a patriarch in the more literal sense, for after him, three more generations of Cassinis served the French court in the direction of the Observatory that he had set up. He maintained an extensive correspondence with natural philosophers in other countries, not least with Fellows of the Royal Society in England. Anna Cassini has given an excellent account of his long, varied and fruitful life; it is thorough, well documented and copiously illustrated, with a selection in handsome colour. The print, paper, layout and binding are all to a high standard. Her book is both of great interest and a pleasure to handle, but as it is privately published at a modest price by Cassini's home town of Perinaldo, by which it is a handsome work of piety, alas it will probably not become known as it deserves outside Italy. Steno (1638 Steno ( -1686 . This chapter does the same for Hooke in the Isle of Wight with real insight. Other chapters address 'Hooke's and other theories of the Earth', his 'Concept of polar wandering' and his 'Theory of evolution and attitude towards God and time'. The two final chapters are 'Plagiarism or paranoia' and a 'Final assessment'. The first of these discusses Hooke's priorities and whether he had an ungentlemanly, or even tradesmanlike, attitude in such disputes. Dr Drake's discussion of this is thought-provoking and demonstrates how long the tradition of such priority disputes is in science.
Book Reviews
At the beginning of the seventeenth century spectacle lenses were being transformed into telescopes and microscopes. Exciting new tools became available for man to explore outer space and the inner structure of life and matter; a spectrum which now ranges from black holes to quarks.
Most of the early microscopes consisted of a single convex lens. The lenses were made powerful by grinding or melting glass to form small, almost spherical beads, sometimes less than 1/20 inch in diameter. Magnifications well over ✕ 300 were achieved. With these lenses the subject of the investigation had to be illuminated from behind and placed very close to the lens. In contrast, Hooke's compound microscope, of Micrographia fame, had a lower magnification, but it was possible to study non-transparent subjects in reflected light.
Jan Swammerdam, anatomist, turned to microscopy after his medical training. For about 12 years, before his death at the age of 43 in 1680, he dedicated himself to the dissection and observation of insects and small animals. He was continuously bedevilled by the conflicting pressures of self-fulfilment as a scientist and his obedience to God. Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, a business man, turned to microscopy when he was 40. For 50 years thereafter, before his death in 1723, he pursued microscopy with an unremitting zeal. Acclaimed by Clifford Dobell as 'the father of protozoology and bacteriology', he is recognized by the Royal Society in The Leeuwenhoek Lectures and is celebrated widely for his observations of red corpuscles and spermatozoa.
She also shows the problems faced by historians in later interpreting such disputes. Her 'Final assessment' argues, and again demonstrates, that Hooke's geological contributions certainly surpassed those of Steno. Victor Eyles, in a paper on Steno published in 1958 (but not referred to here), even argued that Hooke had been a direct influence on
Steno. Dr Drake also shows how Hooke's work must have had a profound, if unacknowledged, influence on James Hutton (1726-1797), a hundred years later. Hutton's paternity of 'modern geology' will be celebrated in some bicentenary style this summer. Hooke's achievements must then be in our minds as well, thanks to this outstanding book.
In this book Ruestow explores in depth the creative work of Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek in the context of the intimate interplay of cultural traditions, social relations and personal sensibilities in seventeenth-century Netherlands. It is a fascinating story, richly illustrated and comprehensibly researched.
How objective are observations made by microscopist? This question remains important to this day even though many photographic techniques are available to record and reproduce microscopic images. The microscopes of Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek produced highly distorted images, which were recorded in sketches made either by the microscopist or an artist. These difficulties add to the subjective elements that condition what the observer 'sees'.
Two issues are discussed relating to seventeenth-century philosophical and religious views about creation and the existence of God. First, the concept of spontaneous generation and, second, the belief in pre-existence of all life. These issues pressed in on Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek as they spent long periods closeted with their microscopes. In microscopy, image recognition and interpretation are strongly dependent on the observer's knowledge and understanding. It seems almost inevitable that philosophical and religious matters would intervene. Perhaps the most bizarre example of the confusion that can arise relates to Leeuwenhoek's acceptance of pre-existence. In studying the shape of the tadpole-like forms of spermatozoa he suspected, he thought he could almost say 'there lies the head and there as well the shoulders and there the hips'.
In the closing chapter Ruestow reviews the reasons for the demise of microscopy, following the excitement of the second half of the seventeenth century, and its reemergence in the nineteenth century. There was a distrust of microscopy, it had no firm institutional moorings, it was perceived as a field for amateur enthusiasts and, above all, it provided only a meagre research agenda. All this has changed dramatically, but the microscopist would do well to recognize the subjective elements of his work.
But the real thrill of microscopy, which is captured in this book through the work of Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek, is the excitement one feels exploring, through the microscope, the beauty and order of all created things. An experience that leads some men to speak of God, and modern determinists to speak of 'an appetite for wonder'. Surely the same experience with different labels.
More instances of beneficent acts might be collected of him than perhaps of any of his contemporaries.
John Tatlow, 1790
John Whitehurst, Lunar Society Member and F.R.S. 1779, has long deserved full biographical study. Maxwell Craven has done this in a most attractive and wellillustrated volume, from which I, at least, was glad to discover that John Robey is back in publishing. The book has 11 chapters. 'An introduction' places Derby in its context for Whitehurst's arrival from Congleton, then Whitehurst's 'Origins and beginnings' are discussed. Other chapters consider Whitehurst's links with the Lunar Society and the Derby paintergenius, Joseph Wright. More fine local history discusses 'Kedleston Hall and its influence', and Whitehurst's work in 'Geology and ceramics' is considered. Whitehurst's move to London in 1775 as 'Stamper of the money weights' also allows a consideration of his wider interests. Finally the important 'Clockmaking of Whitehurst and of his descendants after 1780' is revealed in two fine chapters, which give detailed and finely illustrated syntheses, both of what is known and of what has survived. Whitehurst's 'Character and heirs' forms a penultimate study and another, 'His legacy', concludes the volume, with genealogical tables and ten appendices. These list Derby clockmakers before Whitehurst, the Whitehurst firm's apprentices and employees, selected subscribers to his 1778 Theory, lists of his publications, and of his angle barometers, turret, church (one in my own village) and other clocks. Others transcribe his will and analyse typical features of Whitehurst clocks.
The volume highlights the real achievements of the local historian. Charles Hutton, a previous Whitehurst biographer, noted how little was known of his early life and work. Craven's volume fills many of these lacunae, although understandably there has to be some rather conjectured history. Derby is certainly demonstrated to have been the centre of a highly enlightened society in the 18th century. The horologist and historian of technology will welcome this volume, a tour de force of documentation. The time-consuming scholarship of this documentation is the highlight of this important book.
But the book also demonstrates the weaknesses of a local history approach. Whitehurst moved in 1775 from a provincial, local situation to a national, metropolitan position. Craven wants us to regard Whitehurst as 'father of modern geology', on the basis of his most extensive publication, We are told that 'Whitehurst's preeminence [over James Hutton (1726-1797) as geology's father] has long been restored among geologists'. This may be the local view, but it is not one held elsewhere. Craven wants the paternity of 'modern geology' conceded to Whitehurst, but fails to take into account Hutton's work before the final, incomplete and deathbed, publication of his Theory, between 1785 and 1797. This had included two visits to Derbyshire in 1774, of which we are told nothing. These must surely have included meetings with Whitehurst and may be another probable influence on him. What also of the influence of Raspe, a member of the London Club of 13 of 1775-76, to which Whitehurst also belonged? Dennis Dean's 1992 reappraisal of Hutton confirms how Whitehurst's Theory should be regarded as one of the last of 'old' geology, only in a Derbyshire context can it be seen as 'new'. But this book has wonderfully illuminated that context. This biography provides an account of Davy's life and science that will be of interest to a wide audience. It was first published in 1992 by Blackwells, and is now reprinted in the series of 'Cambridge Science Biographies', of which David Knight is general editor. The series aims to provide an introduction to the history of science through the biographies of scientists, blending the human stories with an accessible account of scientific work.
Writing the biography of a scientist can present problems: the hero is likely to have spent nearly all of his or her time in the laboratory or study. But the life of Davy breaks the mould. First there is the drama of his social career, with his rapid transition from humble beginnings to a baronetcy and presidency of the Royal Society. His scientific and personal life had plenty of variety and activity: his lectures at the Royal Institution, the friendships with Coleridge and Wordsworth, the invention of the safety lamp, his trip to Paris during the war between Britain and France, and his cultivation and later estrangement from Michael Faraday.
Davy's writings cover an unusual range, including works on agricultural chemistry and tanning; a treatise on chemical theory; papers on acidity, chlorine and the chemical effects of electricity; poetry (of which Knight gives many examples); a book on salmon fishing; and (finally) his philosophical musings. Knight covers all of this with a light touch, and in a colloquial style. Ideas spark off the page, and the author is never afraid to go for the wider generalization. He handles the chemical theorizing deftly. Davy's chemistry is not scientifically intractable, but it is difficult to communicate while remaining true to the language and concepts of the primary texts. Davy rejected (productively) Lavoisier's oxygen theory of acidity; and he was unimpressed with the chemical atomic theory, regarding Dalton as the Kepler of chemistry, looking for a Of all the philosophies of and about science in this century, Popper's was perhaps the most influential among scientists themselves. His emphasis on the crucial significance of bold theorizing in the search for truth, together with his insistence on the necessary fallibility of theories, commended itself as something of a liberation after a long-standing diet of logical positivism, inductivism and physical reductionism. Thus practitioners of the more theoretical sciences welcomed Popper's argument to the effect that although theories can never be certain nor their conclusions deductively established, they can yet become ever more general and powerful, and would, he hoped, thereby lead closer to the truth.
This book is a collection of 16 essays by Popper's friends and colleagues. It covers a wide range of the philosophical topics to which Popper has contributed, largely by extending the 'critical method' that he had derived from a philosophical analysis of the sciences. His formula for the method was to start with a problem situation, conjecture a hypothesis or more generally a solution, followed by criticism and practical test, and the elimination of error. In its application to natural science, this method is the opposite of inductivism, in that it starts with problems rather than with facts, and does not claim to establish theories by any sort of logical method, but only to be able to eliminate by stringent test those that are false.
As an analysis of science, this method has been shown to be fraught with difficulties, many of which are examined in the first half of this book. The difficulties have become more pressing since Popper's first writings, because many studies both in logic and in the history of scientific development are now available to show that the analysis is inadequate. The main dilemma is this: Popper began by insisting that theories can be conclusively falsified by observation (though not shown to be true), but (as he also admitted, sotto voce) reports of observations are not certainly true either, because they must always be linguistic interpretations of Newton to provide laws for Dalton's empirical relations. Knight describes the rationale of Davy's scientific ideas within their context, and shows how they shaped his chemical discoveries and outlook.
The book would have benefited from some stylistic revision before its reissue; and I do miss the absence of illustrative material, which is especially appropriate in a popular biography. what is perceived. Therefore, they cannot form premises for the deduction of the falsity of theories that entail them. Several of the authors in the book tackle this problem directly. Lipton and Zahar both assume a perceptual basis of knowledge that can be taken as true, verified or reliable, but neither does enough to clarify these tricky concepts, indeed Zahar even admits that the related concepts verifiability/falsifiability were not meant by Popper 'in any literal sense'. This is an odd admission, given that their correlates true/false are given their literal sense in logic, and there is no discussion in the book of what might be their 'non-literal' uses. This dilemma is related to a surprising absence in the book of any detailed discussion of the problem of realism, which has much exercised philosophers of science and many scientists in recent decades. Given that theories are fallible, is there any sense in which we can claim that they describe reality? Popper held a robust realist position on this question, but again his arguments fell foul of the difficult notion of 'truth', for which he depended uncritically on Tarski's semantic theory, which in turn is uncritically 'realist'.
A PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE AND HUMANISM
Sitting uneasily with his realism is another of Popper's suggestions, namely that the observational basis is a social convention, regulated as it were by the institutions of science. This is taken up in several chapters of the book, and developed in some of them into an evolutionary epistemology. Perhaps the biological and even social evolution of humans has after all established a propensity to use inductive methods for problems, as well as Popper's conjectures and trial and error. This epistemological hypothesis may be expressed by saying that survival has ensured, and experience has taught, that we should assume that the theories most to be relied on are (by and large) those that predict that the future will be (more or less) like the past. This of course does not rule out the possibility that our species may at any time be destroyed by a general falsification of this hypothesis, so it does not offend Popper's anti-inductivism.
The hypothesis does raise interesting questions about novelty, creativity and freedom. These are taken up more generally in essays on physical determinism. Miller and Clark provide convincing analyses of the current scientific position, including the consequences of chaos theory, and have no difficulty in showing that a Laplacean global determinism is not only undermined by modern physics, but cannot even be supported by a Newtonian mechanistic theory. Like Popper himself, Clark also takes the (currently unfashionable) position that if there were global determinism from original physical conditions to every later state of the universe, including reduction of all biology to physics, then belief in human freedom in any non-trivial sense would be false. Both of these doctrines are of course metaphysical, in the sense that science cannot prove or disprove either, but, as Popper himself would argue, scientific theory cannot fail to have an influence on the critique of metaphysical theories, and therefore the current status of determinism in physics is highly relevant to the human concern with freedom.
The last third of the book includes essays on Popper's philosophy of historical explanation, and his approach In recent years numerous biographical dictionaries of scientists have appeared, and at first sight it seems doubtful whether there really is room for yet another such volume. If it is to prove its worth as a contribution to the history of science, any new dictionary of scientists must offer something that is both useful and different from its rivals, whether well-established or more recent. In The Cambridge Dictionary of Scientists the authors have succeeded in meeting these criteria, and have produced a useful, attractive reference book with some original features.
In common with similar biographical dictionaries this book chronicles the main discoveries, inventions and theories introduced by the key contributors to the development of modern science. The entries, arranged alphabetically, each begin with a statement of dates, nationality and subject area, making it a traditional quick-reference book giving to politics and ethics. In a detailed analysis of historiography, Minogue shows how Popper's application of the problem-solving method is not a sufficient explanation of historical events. Historical actors are also complex moral beings whose criteria for choice in decision situations are not reducible to Popper's simple principle of minimizing suffering and maximizing happiness. The same theme is taken up by Magee in a clear-sighted account of the proper aims of politics. He agrees with Popper's pragmatic commitment to piecemeal alleviation of social problems, rather than to large-scale Utopian prescriptions, but dissents from the implied claim that a problem-solving approach is the major element in decision-making. These chapters are in many ways the most illuminating for the general reader, for they show why Popper is at once a philosopher almost in the grand manner, with universal concerns, but at the same time fails, because of the narrow basis of his philosophy in science, to become a philosopher of deep moral seriousness.
Taken together, these essays provide a clear and extensive critique, which could form both an introduction to Popper's thought and an indication of how it stands in relation to more recent developments in science, history of science and philosophy. The book can be commended to both professionals and the general reader, and is a timely memorial to one of the most creative and influential philosophers of our time.
the salient facts about the lives and work of its subjects at a glance. Over 1300 entries representing more than 38 countries include most of the important names in the history of science from the ancient Greeks to the present; only those who have made the most significant contributions to modern science and technology have been included. Each entry is self-contained, and references to external sources such as biographies or obituaries are omitted, although the authors make general acknowledgement of their secondary sources in the Preface. For readers who might wish to pursue a particular subject further, the absence of references to fuller information may be thought a disadvantage, but in a handy reference book such as this, intended to have popular appeal, they would add to the length and the cost of the book without serving its main purpose. A somewhat unusual feature of the book is the special attention that has been paid to pioneer women in science whose achievements and example paved the way to easier entry to scientific careers for other women.
But in addition to its function as a biographical dictionary, The Cambridge Dictionary of Scientists also aims to offer an outline of the history of science itself and it is in this respect that it differs from other similar works. The authors' stated aim is 'to survey the sciences through the lives of the men and women whose efforts have shaped modern science', and they have used the biographical details to construct a historical overview of the sciences themselves. Their aim to integrate the entries so as to provide a survey of the rise of modern science through the activities of its leading practitioners becomes evident in the excellent index, which lists not only all the individuals whose work is described, but also a wealth of subject references by which the origins and originators of scientific ideas and discoveries, as well as some important inventions, can be traced. Thus, in making it a dictionary of science as well as of scientists the authors attempt to offer much more than a mere biographical dictionary; they provide brief historical background and detail for most of the scientific ideas in modern currency in the chemical, physical, biological, earth and space sciences, not forgetting important links with related areas of mathematics, medicine and technology.
In another useful feature serving the same purpose, the dictionary also contains 33 panels, each giving, in outline, the main developments in a particular area of science or technology of current interest. These panels present 'thumbnail sketches' of the history of a wide range of scientific ideas from space exploration to AIDS and HIV, from the history of nuclear and particle physics to the entry of women into medicine, chemistry in Britain and the biological sciences. There is a family tree of the Darwin/Wedgwood/Galton relationships and panels on the history of genetics and the quest for human origins. Each panel is a model of conciseness, covering in a page or so the main names and events in the development of its subject matter. By using these panels, or the index, to follow up all the available references in this dictionary, a moderately detailed history of most subjects in modern science can be obtained. In addition, there are many small, clear diagrams explaining the workings of technical devices or the details of ideas discussed and, with simple explanations, these give added
